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COURTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN THE
INDIAN HIGH COURTS
Jill Cottrell*
In a society aspiring to be democratic, or which claims to be governed
by the rule of law, no one (mark "no one," meaning thereby even the
judiciary) can exercise its power without there being corresponding
accountability - Ravani J. in Surat M.C. v. Rameschandra1
Since the early 1980s the Indian Supreme Court has developed
a bundle of procedures to be used in cases intended to represent
the interests of the voiceless poor, which depart considerably from
the classic common law model of the gladiatorial dispute between
affected parties fought out before a passive judicial umpire.2 At
its core is an expanded concept of locus standi - embracing
organisations or individuals which are not even a segment of the
affected classes, and who would previously have been regarded as
busy-bodies. Actions may be begun informally, even by letter
addressed to the Court, and not necessarily supported by affidavit.
The Supreme Court itself may appoint individuals or organisations
to carry out factual investigations, or may in effect require the
state to produce evidence. Orders made may go beyond the
formal parties to the litigation, and are more likely to involve
future action rather than backward looking remedies, and
respondents may be required to report progress in implementation
to the Court. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is based
on Article 32 of the Constitution - for the enforcement of
fundamental rights - and these "public interest litigation" (PIL)
cases must be anchored to this, although an expansive view of
particular human rights provisions has often been taken, and
. Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1. AIR 1986 Guj. 50, 52.
2. See genera/y "Taking Suffering Seriously" in Baxi ed., Law and Povwiy (Bombay,
Tripathi, 1988).
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remedies have been tailored to the circumstances going far beyond
what courts are accustomed to award. The Court has sometimes
suggested that this is not really an adversary form of litigation,
since it is directed towards realising rights to which the authorities
are already committed under the Constitution and legislation. In
many countries one might expect these cases to be taken to a
complaints procedure - or to an ombudsman. But in India, at
the federal level, there is no ombudsman, and plans to create one
have not tended to envisage so much a remedy for
maladministration as one for corruption. Chinnappa Reddy, J., of
the Supreme Court said: "It is not the Judiciary, but the
Parliament and the Executive that have failed the people."3
At the High Court level the relevant article - 226 - reads:
every High Court shall have power...to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases any Government... directions,
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them,
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
[fundamental rights] and for any other purpose.
This is evidently wider than article 32; in recent years the Supreme
Court has on a number of occasions refused to entertain writ
petitions, saying that they ought to be taken to the High Court
first.
This paper is based on 114 PIL or "near PIL" cases in the
High Courts. Most of them are to be found in the law reports, but
a few are derived from other sources. The following table shows
the cases broken down by state and broad topic:
3. Inaugural address to Seminar on "Socialism, Constitution and the Country Today" AIR
1983 Jour. 33, 39.
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State4
AP As Bh De Gj HP KT JK Ke NP Na Or PH Rj TN UP WS
Concern
1 2
2 7 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 5
1 2
1 1 1
3
2 4
2 1 11
1
2 2
1
1
Envi ronment
Pub.heaLth
Drink/drugs
Presn.bLdgs.
Education
Pub faci Ls.
ViLLages
PoLice
Crime
Prisons
Judy/courts
Squatters
Censorship
PoLitics
Foreign rets
Strikes
Pub. order
Workers
Harijans
Women
ChiLdren
mndiv. Coempn.
Admi n.
Misc.
114 8 1 1 2 7 8 6 4 6 7 10 3 1 34 44 10
There is a definitional problem. Professor Baxi would confine
use of the concept (social action litigation, he terms it) to cases
genuinely on behalf of the oppressed classes.5 On this basis many
of the cases looked at here would not merit that "accolade" - but
that is one of the points of the paper. I want to explore how far
litigants seem to have been using the High Courts for the same
sorts of purposes as those served by Supreme Court PIL litigation.
For this purpose, it seems to me, it is worthwhile, perhaps
necessary, to look at cases in the High Courts which seem to be
inspired by PIL, or by the same sorts of impulses as have led to
PIL, in the Supreme Court. Not every PIL case has every PIL
4. Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Jammu
& Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab & Haryana, Rajasthan,
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.
5. Baxi, op. cit. at p. 398n.
1 2
2 2 1
TotaL
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characteristic, there are degrees of "PILness" as it were. The
majority of these cases were either held by the court, or argued
unsuccessfully by the petitioner, to be PIL. Some have been
included because they have PIL characteristics to some extent,
either because they have been started by means of a letter, or they
involve an expanded concept of locus standi, or because of the
nature of the orders made, although they may not have been
described as "PIL" by court or advocate.
The variations between states in this Table are of limited
significance. The superficially astonishing figures for Rajasthan
reflect partly that there has indeed been what seems to have been
a largely home-grown PIL movement since the end of the 1970s,
under which one lawyer in particular, often in collaboration with
one particular local politician, has bombarded the High Court
(especially in Jodhpur) with petitions; it also reflects his
publication of a number of petitions in book form.6 The Table
reflects only the cases initiated by the High Courts, but a more
complete picture would be obtained by looking at cases in the
Supreme Court also. Whether the petitioner chooses to
commence the action in the High Court or the Supreme Court will
depend upon a number of factors. One would naturally expect
more cases to go to the Supreme Court in states more remote
geographically from New Delhi (the only place where the Supreme
Court sits). Possibly some organisations or individuals who bring
PIL petitions are more oriented toward Delhi (or may even be
based in Delhi, even thQugh they litigate about issues in distant
states). The highly publicized Supreme Court cases have led to
many petitions being brought there when they could equally have
been brought in the State High Court. Some High Courts have
been more positive in their reactions to PIL than others, as we
shall see, and this must affect the choice of venue by petitioners.
The paucity of cases from Bihar in the Table is especially
misleading. Bihar has been a byword for official lawlessness, and
6. M. Mridul, Pub/ic Interest Litigation: A Profile (Jaipur, Bharat Law House, 1986).
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several of the most horrifying revelations made through PIL in the
Supreme Court have concerned that State.
The PIL phenomenon will become clearer if we look in more
detail at one case: in Citizens Action Committee, Nagpur v. Civil
Surgeon, Mayo Hospital,7 an organisation of citizens brought
petitions against various public authorities complaining of the poor
condition of roads, congestion, poor public sanitation and the
condition of three government hospitals. The court appointed two
committees to report to it, and these supported the allegations of
the petitioners. After consultation with the hospital authorities the
court instituted an Investigative and Remedial Measures
Suggestive Committee. With regard to thirty-six areas of the city
said to have inadequate roads, water and drainage, the State
Government was directed to appoint a Committee, and to issue
directions to the various bodies concerned to provide the missing
facilities. The Electricity Board was directed to provide lighting;
the cleaning of certain ditches was ordered; the Public Works
Department was to repair the hospital compounds; the State was
directed to take steps to provide thirty-five more paediatric beds.
On a number of points the authorities had assured that steps were
being or would be taken and the court therefore felt it unnecessary
to make any order, and at some points the court advised rather
than ordered a course of action. This case is not typical of the
reported PIL cases in the High Courts; it resembles far more some
of the Supreme Court cases.
Without field research, comparison between the demands
being addressed to the Supreme Court and to the High Courts is
effectively impossible. Many of the applications made to the
Supreme Court are in the form of letters, and these are weeded
out by a committee. Only those which reach a certain threshold
in terms of human rights issues, and which raise the vulnerability
of the section of the community affected, ever get to the stage of
a hearing. As a result, very few litigated cases are completely
unsuccessful in the Supreme Court. The boundaries of PIL are
7. AIR 1986 Bombay 136.
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therefore much more likely to be set in the Supreme Court in
appeals from the High Courts, but thus far there have been very
few such appeal cases. Partly this is because of the relatively
recent development of PIL in the High Courts, partly because
there is no appeal as of right in such matters (and High Courts
have quite frequently declined to certify quite important cases as
justifying appeal to the Supreme Court), and no doubt because
unsuccessful petitioners at the High Court level have no stomach,
or funds, for the fight in the Supreme Court. There have been a
very few cases in which the Supreme Court has taken the view that
a High Court has gone too far - in asserting its power by
ordering the government in one case to set up a committee to
consider legislation,8 and in another by imposing an interim
injunction against the transmission of a TV series.9
We turn to the reactions of the High Courts themselves.
There is a distinction between permitting someone to bring an
action, and actually being able to give them a remedy. The Delhi
High Court had no difficulty with the notion that social action
groups should bring a suit intended to prompt investigation into
the riots after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, but found either no
power or no necessity to order the authorities to take any more
steps than they had already taken.1°  The Chief Justice of
Himachal Pradesh was evidently an enthusiast for PIL - and even
accepted an anonymous letter from "Citizens of Simla."" During
the 1980s, cases received a mixed reception in Rajasthan, but
evidently GM Lodha J was happy that "poor, ignorant,
downtrodden, suffers of injustice have been allowed to enter
'Temples of Justice' without formal dress, flowers, rituals or
chanting of mantras";" but the same year another High Court
Judge in the state observed, "We do not want to encourage such
sort of litigation, otherwise the traditional litigation will suffer."' 3
8. State of Hinachal Pradesh v. Parent of Student of Medical College, AIR 1985 SC 910.
9. Oddeisey v. Lokvidayana Sanghatana AIR 1988 SC 1642.
10. PUDR v. Min of Home Affairs AIR 1985 Delhi 271.
11. 1983 ILR (Himachal Pradesh) 5.
12. Citizens of Bundi v. Municipal Board AIR 1988 Raj 132, 135.
13. Rajasthan Kuan Sangha v. State AIR 1988 Raj 10, 16.
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Not every court seems to have been presented with promising
cases - which accounts for the fact that the High Court of Jammu
and Kashmir threw out all the reported cases they were asked to
treat as PIL.
Like the Supreme Court, the High Courts have worked their
way only gradually to an expanded concept of locus standi. At
least one judge in Andhra Pradesh was arguing for an broad
approach as long ago as 1972 and 1974, before the appearance of
any of the Supreme Court cases usually cited as being the seeds of
PIL. But in 1980 the same Court insisted, "The mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen of India or the President of the Indian
Fundamental Rights Association does not confer any right on him
to seek relief under art. 226.''15 For many lawyers and courts, the
first major breakthrough in the Supreme Court was the Judges'
Transfer case in 1981,16 but even before that case, the Gujarat
High Court held that the Consumer Education and Research
Centre had locus standi to challenge the winding up of an inquiry
into a dam collapse. 7
The High Court cases seem to fall into certain clusters,
sometimes coming largely from one state. Some of the cases
would undoubtedly receive Supreme Court blessing as "valid" PIL
- in the sense that they are in the interests of classes which would
normally have no effective access to the courts. This would
include the Andhra Pradesh case of Harijan pig breeders fighting
the impact of legislation which would have meant the destruction
of their pigs without efforts having been made to improve their
management methods."8 There have been several cases on
treatment of prisoners: in a case from Madras petitions were filed
by a prisoner and on the instructions of duty counsel, complaining
that prisoners were being constantly remanded in custody without
14. T Narayana Reddy v. Govt. of AP ILR 1972 AP 955; Warangal CC v. Director of
Marketing AIR 1975 AP 245 on both of which Ekbote J sat.
15. KR.K Vara Prasad v. Uo AIR 1980 AP 243, 246.
16. S.P. Gupta v. Uol AIR 1982 SC 149.
17. CERC v. State (1981) XXII Guj. L.R. 712, citing the earlier Fertilizf Corporation
Kamgar Union v. UoI AIR 1981 SC 344.
18. A.P. Adimajati Sewa Sangham v. Guntur M.C. AIR 1987 AP 193.
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ever being produced in court;19 two cases involved the payment
of wages to prisoners for work. In Kerala it was held that failure
to pay a reasonable wage amounted to bonded labour contrary to
art. 23 of the Constitution, while in Andhra Pradesh the High
Court disagreed with this analysis - but reached a not dissimilar
conclusion via the right-to-life article (21). The same issue was
one of several in the Goan case of Inacio.21 Other cases have
concerned the eviction of squatters,' the running of a children's
home,' and allegations of police brutality, or inactivity.' There
have been several involving environmental or public health issues
- for example the effect of quarrying in the Shivalik Hillss
pollution of lakes in Udaipur,' drainage in Sardarnagar in
Gujarat,' sanitary conditions in Simla,' and the suggestion that
butter imported under EEC aid programmes was contaminated
with Chernobyl fallout."
However, the overall impression is that litigants have been
using - or trying to use - the High Courts for purposes which
are more parochial, more middle-class, more paternalistic and, in
a number of ways, more overtly political than has been permitted
in the Supreme Court. To some extent, this reflects just the sorts
of cases which the Supreme Court would encourage to go to the
High Courts. A broad PIL strategy would suggest that the
Supreme Court should be used where it is desirable to obtain the
articulation of a principle that could then be used in the lower
courts, or where an issue is of national importance. It is also
19. Elumalai v. State 1984 ILR (1) Mad. 312.
20. Re Pison Reforms, Enhancement of Wages AIR 1983 Ker. 261; Poola Bhaskaran
VKjayakumar v. State AIR 1988 AP 295.
21. See also Nawab luhore Thakur 1984 ILR (Him.) 381.
22. Re No. 57 Block Bastuhara Committee AIR 1987 Cal. 122; Ram Prasad Yadav v.
Chairman Bombay Ports Authority 1989 (1) SCALE 713.
23. Sheela Barse v. Sec. Children's Aid Society 1987 1 SC 584.
24. Re Inquiry into Gang Rape 1988 20 1JR (Gauhati) 92, Rajasthan lian Sangha above
n. 13, State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal AIR 1985 SC 195.
25. lInkri Devi v. State AIR 1988 HP 4.
26. Balwant Singh Mehta v. State Unrep (see Mridul for petition).
27. Janki Nathubhai Chhara v. Sardarnagar AIR 1986 Guj. 49.
28. Yoginder Lal Sharma v. MC Shimla 1983 ILR (Him) 457.
29. Sivarao Shantaram Wagle v. Uo AIR 1988 SC 952.
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sometimes argued that one of the values of PIL may be the
publicity attaching to the litigation process, and this will no doubt
be much greater if the court is the Supreme Court. Thus after a
number of prominent prison cases in the Supreme Court,
concerning mostly Bihar, or Tihar jail in Delhi, it is not surprising
to find several High Court cases focusing on local jails." Cases
concerning inadequate drainage in a particular town, open
manholes in Jodhpur or Jaipur,31 pollution of a local water
supply32 and so on, would seem appropriate for the local High
Court. The same is true of a number of cases concerning the use
of parks or designated recreation areas for other purposes. 3
Among other cases concerning state governments have been one
about the licensing of the sale of arrack in polythene bags
(allegedly a health hazard)' or the failure of the same state
government to check illegal tree felling. 5
By "political" I mean more overtly party political or concerned
with government policy. Sometimes one might say that litigants
were "trying it on" - and have been given short shrift by the
court. A blatant example was the attempt in Calcutta to ban the
Koran as tending to stir up communal disharmony.36 Attempts
to persuade the Madras High Court to direct the Government of
India to intervene in Sri Lanka, or that of Andhra Pradesh to
order the proclamation of Martial Law,37 or the consideration of
whether to impose President's Rule,3 or to get mandamus in
Kerala to compel the implementation of an election manifesto a
30. See notes 21-22 above, plus Ranchod v. State (MP) 1988 16 UR 147.
31. Vjay Mehta v. MC Jodhpur (for petition see Mridul), Legal Aid Clinic, University of
Rajasthan, Jaipur - see Kagzi, The Present Constitutional Issues and Views (New Delhi,
Metropolitan, 1987) p. 203.
32. Sampat Raj Jain v. Raj. State Board for Prevention of Water Pollution (see Mridul).
33. Citizens of Bundi, above n. 12, T. Damodhar Rao v. SO, MC Hyderabad AIR 1987 SC
171, SN Rao v. State of Maharashtra 1988 1 SC 566, Calcutta Youth Front v. State 1986 (2)
Ca. LJ 26.
34. George Mampilly v. State AIR 1985 Ker. 24.
35. VM. Abraham v. State 1987 (1) Ker. L.T. 57.
36. Chadanmal Chopra v. State AIR 1986 Cal. 104.
37. Chinta Subba Rao v. Supreme Commander AIR 1980 AP 172.
38. Dhronamraju Satyanarayana v. N.T.Rama Rao AIR 1988 AP 69.
39. 1988 (2) Ker. L.T. 209.
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were all disposed of in a fairly summary way. A number of cases
alleging corruption have been dismissed, as there are other
avenues for redress such as the state ombudsman.' The
Allahabad High Court refused to order the government to ban
strikes by certain employees. 1
But not all politically motivated cases have been dismissed. A
striking example also comes from Andhra Pradesh: the High
Courts found a number of allegations against the Chief Minister
proven.2 And a number of cases have been brought by
politicians. In the Judges' Transfer case, the Supreme Court said:
"We must be careful to see that the member of the public who
approaches the court in cases of this kind is acting bona fide and
not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or
other oblique consideration."4 3 But are politicians to be deprived
of a right to bring PIL cases? In the Dhronamraju Satyanarayana
cases, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that one could not
throw out serious allegations just because they were filed by a
political rival, and for political motives. In Madhya Pradesh the
leader of the opposition in the state brought a petition alleging the
improper conduct of a lottery, and that it was protected by
powerful people." The petition was successful despite the court's
recognition that it had political overtones. Mr. Vijay Mehta, who
has brought a number of cases in Rajasthan, is a secretary of his
local Communist Party. But the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir
did observe in one case that "a tendency has developed among
some busy-bodies and meddlesome interlopers to boost their
political image, by moving the court for what is called a public
interest litigation .... 
40. E.g., P.N. Dubey v. Uol AIR 1989 NP 225, S.S. Banja Deo v. Janaki Baglav 1986 61
Cuttack L.T. 52.
41. Anand Mohan v. Uo 1984 All. L.J. 1293.
42. Dhronamraju Satyanarayana v. N.TRama Rao AIR 1988 AP 144; the court then
adjourned the case so that all affected parties might be before it for the final order, but I have
not been able to find that stage reported.
43. AIR 1981 SC at p. 195.
44. Kailash Joshi v. MP 1989 Jab.LJ. 127.
45. him Singh v. D.D. Thakur 1982 XV J & K LR 464 at p. 487.
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By "middle-class" I have in mind, for example, the cases
concerning the use of land previously used, or zoned, for parks or
similar purposes, for residential or commercial uses, the best
known being the use of part of Calcutta zoo's land for a hotel. 6
The ragging of freshers at university, 7 the demolition of the
elegant Attara Cutcherry housing the High Court in Bangalore, 4
the demolition of sanitary facilities at railway stations, 9 the
failure to provide state funding for private law schools,5" the
inadequacy of the telephone service,51 the failure to provide
adequate electric power to the High Court or to allocate it
sufficient funds52 or the institution of a one-way system on a road
leading to the High Court,53 not to mention the challenge to a
statue of Gandhi on the basis that it made him look
"depressed"'54 could all be characterised as representing middle
class concerns rather than those of the weaker sections.
There is inevitably something rather paternalistic about the
whole PIL movement, but some of the High Court cases have
been, to my mind, especially so. Cases in Himachal Pradesh,
requiring the Government to comply with its own rules about
siting outlets for alcoholic drinks where the weak-willed will not be
tempted or the sensitive offended, are one example. 5 There have
been cases trying to stop television programmes because they
would stir up communal harmony, or encourage superstitious
beliefs' to stop the importation of foreign films or the screening
46. Sachidanand Pandey v. State AIR 1987 SC 1109.
47. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of Student of Medical Collee AIR 1985 SC 910.
48. B. V. Narayana Reddy v. State AIR 1985 Kant. 99; the Court quoted the Hndu: "elitist
exercise in false nostalgia and anachronistic sentimentality" - at p. 102.
49. Ramanthsekhar v. Pando Padhaya AIR 1987 Born. 98.
50. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi v. State AIR 1988 Born. 296.
51. Vjay Mehta v. Uo (see Mridul).
52. CC Jain v. State (Mridul) and Vijay Mehta v State (ibid.) respectively.
53. Ram Sahai Verma v. State AIR 1989 MY 334.
54. Babubhai Jashbhai Patel v. State AIR 1988 Guj. 1,
55. Citizens of Simla v. State 1983 ILR (Him) 5 and HIunachal Pradesh Nashabandi
Parishad v. State, ibid p. 493.
56. The former was Ramesh v. UoI 1988 19 JiR 364 - the programme was Tamas (shown
in 1990 on British TV); both the HC and the SC rejected this characterisation. The second
case was Oddessey above n. 10.
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of television programmes undermining Indian culture, or the
broadcasting of vulgar songs, or the sale of foreign pornography."
Most of these have been unsuccessful (in one case unsuccessful
only in the Supreme Court after succeeding in the High Court)5
or the outcome is unknown. However, the Madras High Court did
overturn the decision of the Board of Film Censors - partly on
the grounds that the film to which the Board had given a license
insulted Dr. Ambedkar and the "backward classes." 9
Few of the High Court cases involve the scope of the famous
Supreme Court cases, or their innovative quality of procedure.
However, quite a number have been started by the use of letters
- or even a telegram. A few have involved the rights of
individuals rather than groups, but have had a PIL quality in that
they have been started by a letter - or even by the Judge who
read a letter in the press!' Another example of judicial initiative
was in Assam: the CJ read in his morning newspaper an account
of gang rape by police and initiated a writ petition on this basis.61
Again, a few have involved the sort of fact-finding initiative taken
in the Supreme Court. For example, a Court directed the State
Government to set up a committee to look into the impact of
mining.62 We have already seen that an elaborate range of issues
was inquired into by a committee appointed by the court in the
Nagpur case.
The most consistently successful cases have involved prisoners'
rights, and several concerning the rights of workers have also
achieved a degree of success. Other notable cases include that in
which the Andhra Pradesh government was directed to identify
alternative sites for pig owners, to help the owners to breed them
57. All these were in Rajasthan: the first two, Vijay Mehta v. Uo both in 1986, see
Mridul, the third Abeer Chand v. Uo (ibid) and the last Rajasthan Progressive Writers
Association in 1983 (ibid) - this petition was unsuccessful.
58. Oddessey above n. 10.
59. P. Jagajeevan Ram v. Gol AIR 1989 Mad. 149.
60. IAK Martiyani v. RegionalProvident Fund 1983 (2) XXIV Guj. L.R. 927 and Ram Pyan
v. Uo AIR 1988 Raj. 124; see also Kochupennu Lakshmi v. Chairman Kerala State RTC AIR
1984 Ker. 97, Thressia v. Kerala SE Board 1987 (1) Ker. L.T. 492, 1987 (2) K.L.T. 934.
61. Re Inquiry into Gang Rape above n. 26.
62. Kinkri Devi v. State AIR 1988 HP 4.
210
COURTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
there, to institute a system for tagging licensed pigs, and to
educate pig owners;' the Kerala case in which the decision to
permit packaging of arrack in polythene bags was struck down;"
and the Rajasthan cases in which the governments were ordered
to stop the practice under which Harijans could not enter a temple
without purification,6 or to cover manholes, 66 or to provide
enough traffic police. 7
The scope of possible remedies in PIL is somewhat imprecise.
While there is little difficulty in ordering a government to desist
from a course of action, many cases ask for something much less
simple. Indeed, that is one of the advantages of PIL - it is not
simply a negative procedure. In many cases, as in classic
administrative law, the court can only interfere if a decision has
been arbitrary or in bad faith; the famous Bombay pavement
dwellers case - Olga Tellis - in the Supreme Court, although it
held that "life" under article 21 includes "livelihood" also held that
there is no right to live on pavements and that all the Court could
do was to ensure people were given proper notice to leave. So in
the High Court it was held that traders' huts could not be removed
without a hearing;' squatters must be given notice before
eviction;' planning decisions could only be interfered with if
arbitrary. 7 In this connection I have some doubt about the
action of the Madras Court in apparently substituting its judgment
for that of the Board of Film Censors.71
Some of the most difficult cases centre on the question how
far the court can order government to spend money. If the
government is being ordered to implement existing legislation that
is one thing: in Rajasthan the court suggested it had the
63. Above n. 20.
64. Above n. 36.
65. Surya Narayan Choudhary v. Rajasthan RLW 1988 (2) 31.
66. Above n. 33.
67. Vijay Mehta v. State (Mridul).
68. Nehru Marg Cabin Association v. Modasa Nagar Palika 1988 VIII (1) Guj. LH 289.
69. Re No. 57 Block Bastuhara above n. 24.
70. E.g. Sachidanand Pandey above n. 48.
71. P. Jagajeevan Ram, above n. 61.
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alternative of repealing the legislation if it wished.' In Umed
Ram Sharma the Supreme Court said it was acceptable (just) to
require the state government to consider favourably the
expenditure of money.' The Rajasthan High Court ordered the
government to make available money for a generator for the High
Court itself (and the state tried unsuccessfully to appeal to the
Supreme Court).7 The Bombay High Court ordered the railway
authorities to reinstate demolished lavatories at stations," and the
state government's blanket policy not to provide grants to non-
government law colleges was held unconstitutional.76
Traditionally art. 226 had not been used for financial
compensation. In PIL the Supreme Court has been cautiously
moving on this point. It said that compensation might be awarded
for breach of fundamental rights if "the infringement was patent
and incontrovertible, the violation was gross and its magnitude was
such as to shock the conscience of the court and it would have
been very unjust to the person whose fundamental right was
violated to require him to go to the civil court for claiming
compensation."" The High Courts have perhaps been less
cautious. One or two cases have been really tort or trust cases
riding on the art. 226 vehicle.78 In the Gang Rape case, the Chief
Justice awarded compensation to the affected women on the basis
of the prima facie evidence produced by the Inspector General of
Police." And the Madras High Court ordered the state to pay
compensation (recommended by the Collector) amounting to Rs
3 million to Sikh victims of the riots in the wake of Mrs. Gandhi's
assassination - on the basis that the authorities should have taken
steps to protect their property (as they had their persons).'"
72. L.M. Koolwal v. State AIR 1988 Raj. 2.
73. 1986 1 SCR 251.
74. CC Jain v. State above n. 54.
75. Above n. 51.
76. Above n. 52.
77. MC. Mehta v. UoJ AIR 1987 SC at p. 1091.
78. E.g. Jaram Singh v. State AIR 1988 HP 13, Kalawati v. State AIR 1989 HP 5.
79. Above n. 26.
80. fl Gandhi v. Ul AIR 1989 Mad. 205.
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A feature of some Supreme Court cases has been the setting
out of guidelines, going beyond the circumstances of the case
before it. Similarly, in the High Court case of Elumalai the
petition ostensibly concerned the position of three named
prisoners; however, the High Court directed the magistrates to
look into the cases of all those arrested under certain sections of
the Criminal Procedure Code and set out some "propositions" on
extensions of remands (a combination of statutory interpretation
and common sense).81 In one or two cases the High Court has
persuaded the parties to settle. In Janl Nathubhai Chhara the
High Court persuaded the state to make funds available to
improve drainage. In several cases the litigation seems to have
prompted action by the administration - a tactic which Professor
Baxi has suggested may be intended to avoid the risk of actually
losing on the substantive legal point.8' It is noteworthy that
despite the refusal of the court to interfere in the case of the
Attara Cutcherry, it still houses the Bangalore High Court; this
may suggest that even unsuccessful litigation may have political
impact.
This is very slim evidence on which to decide how far PIL has
become a reality at the High Court level. Informal evidence
suggests that substantial numbers of cases may be in the pipeline,
at least in some states, and time will tell what part this type of
litigation will play in establishing the accountability of the
executive, and to whom.
81. Above n. 21 In Rajesh Khaitan v. State of West Bengal AIR 1985 Cal. 208, the remedy
was a set of suggested "guidelines" for the improvement of the state of the morgue
complained of. And see J. Mohapatra v. State 1984 4 SCC 103 where the Supreme Court set
out guidlines for the selection of books for schools in a case coming from Orissa High Court.
82. Op. cit. at p. 404.

